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Redistributional Effects of the National Flood Insurance Program 
Okmyung Bin, John A. Bishop, and Carolyn Kousky 
Abstract 
This study examines the redistributional effects of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
using a national database of premium, coverage, and claim payments at the county level between 1980 
and 2006.  Measuring progressivity as the departure from per capita county income proportionality, we 
find that NFIP premiums are typically proportional if the time horizon is extended beyond a single year, 
while claim payments are moderately progressive over all time horizons studied.  The net effect of the 
NFIP program, defined as indemnity payments net of premiums, indicates that NFIP is proportional or at 
most mildly progressive, while the effect is modest.  In sum, we find no evidence that the NFIP 
disproportionally advantages richer counties. 
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Redistributional Effects of the National Flood Insurance Program 
Okmyung Bin, John A. Bishop, and Carolyn Kousky 
1. Introduction 
Damage from flood events is not covered by homeowners insurance policies and flood 
insurance is not widely available on the private market.  Flood coverage is offered federally, 
however, through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established by the National 
Flood Insurance Act of 1968.  Under current provisions, if communities choose to adopt 
minimum floodplain management policies, their residents become eligible for this insurance 
backed by the federal government.  The goal of the NFIP is to contain the rising costs of flood 
events and to provide economically feasible relief to victims to help fuel recovery (Pasterick 
1998).  The NFIP is currently managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
within the Department of Homeland Security.  As of June, 2011, there were just over 5.5 million 
policies-in-force nationwide.   
The NFIP has been the subject of renewed interest in recent years.  Unprecedented losses 
associated with Hurricane Katrina and the other storms of the 2005 hurricane season sent the 
program deeply into debt, drawing the attention of people living in floodplains, insurance 
companies, and lawmakers.  The NFIP was not designed to cover catastrophic loss years and its 
current debt to the U.S. Treasury from the 2005 claims—almost $19 billion—has raised concerns 
about the program’s long-term financial solvency.
1  The NFIP will be unable to repay its debt 
given the current structure of premiums.  Should Congress forgive it, taxpayers will bear the 
costs of returning the NFIP to solvency.  In addition to debating debt forgiveness, lawmakers are 
also considering a wide range of other reforms to the program to address both financial 
soundness and concerns about who is and who should bear the burden of flood and hurricane 
costs.
2 
Debate has emerged regarding the redistributional effects of the program.  Little is known 
about whether some groups benefit disproportionately from the way the rates are currently 
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structured or the program is administered.  Some media accounts and advocacy groups have 
argued that the NFIP routinely subsidizes some of the wealthiest and most irresponsible property 
owners (Brannon and Lowell 2011; Holladay and Schwartz 2010; Kearns and Fontana 2007).  
Holladay and Schwartz state that ―the benefits of the NFIP…are enjoyed by the wealthy 
counties.‖  They suggest that the program disproportionately benefits wealthy households and 
owners of vacation homes, many of which are expensive waterfront properties.  Others have 
suggested that the program is a form of assistance for the poor who could not afford to purchase 
flood insurance at private market rates.  There are concerns that the flood insurance reforms 
enhancing the program’s actuarial soundness could have unintended impacts on home 
ownership, including property values and the cost of mortgage credit (King 2006).  In this study 
we provide, as far as we are aware, the first empirical evidence on the overall redistributional 
effects of the NFIP.   
Our analysis of the redistributive effects of the NFIP is based on a unique national 
database of the total dollars of premium, coverage, and claims paid per county per year from 
1980 to 2006.  We measure progressivity as the departure of total county premiums and program 
payouts from per capita county income proportionality.  We find that NFIP premiums are 
typically proportional as the time horizon is extended beyond a single year, while claim 
payments are moderately progressive over all time horizons studied.  The combined or net effect 
of the NFIP program, defined as indemnity payments minus premiums, shows that the NFIP is 
proportional or at most mildly progressive while the effect is modest.  In sum, we find no 
evidence that the NFIP disproportionally advantages richer counties. 
The next section of the paper offers background on the NFIP relevant to understanding its 
redistributional effects.  Section three discusses our data while the fourth section presents our 
methods.  The fifth section summarizes the results, and the sixth section concludes with a 
discussion of our findings and some important caveats to our conclusions.  
2. Background on the NFIP 
The NFIP was created in 1968 out of a concern that private companies were not willing 
or able to cover flood risk due to the catastrophic nature of losses, spatial correlation, and 
adverse selection.  It was thought a government program could overcome these challenges.  The 
NFIP was designed as a partnership between the federal government and local communities.  
FEMA maps the flood hazard in participating communities on Flood Insurance Rate Maps 
(FIRMs).  Participating local governments then adopt baseline regulations in high-hazard areas 
and, in exchange, the federal government provides insurance to homeowners and businesses.  Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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Homeowners can purchase up to $250,000 of building coverage and up to $100,000 of contents 
coverage.  Business-owners can purchase up to $500,000 each of both building and contents 
coverage.
3   
Concerns about the costs of flooding and low take-up rates led Congress in 1973 to make 
the purchase of flood insurance mandatory for property-owners in 100-year floodplains with a 
mortgage from a federally backed lender.  Take-up rates remained low in the early years of the 
program, but they have grown steadily over the decades.  Still, following major flood events, 
concern is often expressed that many at-risk homeowners remain without coverage.  An estimate 
of take-up rates in 100-year floodplains by RAND Corporation found high regional variation, 
with the South and West having the highest take-up rates of around 60 percent, while in the 
Midwest, take-up rates are only around 20-30 percent (Dixon et al. 2006).  The NFIP is also 
highly concentrated geographically, with 40 percent of all policies-in-force nationwide located in 
Florida and close to 70 percent of all policies located in just five states: Florida, Texas, 
Louisiana, California, and New Jersey (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010). 
There are two types of policies in the NFIP: actuarial policies and discounted policies.  
For both types of policies, rates for flood insurance vary by the flood zone indicated on the 
FIRM and structural characteristics of the property.  Currently 78 percent of all policies-in-force 
are what FEMA calls ―actuarial,‖ meaning they are priced using hydrologic models that include 
catastrophic loss year scenarios.
4  The remaining 22 percent of policies are discounted.  These are 
sometimes referred to as subsidized policies, but it is important to note that these are not 
subsidized by the general taxpayer.  Rather, the discounted policies prevent the program from 
developing a catastrophe reserve.  In 1981 it was decided that the combined revenue from the 
actuarial and the discounted policies should be enough to cover losses from the ―average 
historical loss year.‖  After a series of rate increases on the discounted policies, this was achieved 
in 1986.  Due to the discounted policies, therefore, the program does not build up a capital 
reserve to cover high loss years, such as 2005.  If Congress forgives the debt incurred from the 
2005 season, however, the general taxpayer will be subsidizing these policyholders.   
The largest portion of the discounted policies is referred to as ―pre-FIRM.‖  These  
structures were built before the FIRM for a community was available and were offered at 
discounted rates to encourage communities to join the program, to have homeowners cover at 
least some of the costs of flood losses (on the supposition that full rates would be so high that 
individuals would not insure and thus require more disaster aid), and to prevent the abandonment 
of otherwise economically viable structures through high premiums (Hayes and Neal 2009).  
Post-FIRM, new construction is charged actuarial rates.  The subsidy applies only to the first Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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$35,000 of coverage on the building and $10,000 on contents, although the mean and median 
claims in 2004 were below these limits (CBO 2007).  Subsidized properties become required to 
pay actuarial rates when they are damaged at half the property value or when improvements 
increase their value by 50 percent or more (CBO 2007).  It was, therefore, thought the subsidy 
would phase out quickly as structures were damaged or improved, but modern construction 
techniques have extended the life of buildings (Pasterick 1998; CBO 2007).    
After Hurricane Katrina, the NFIP paid out more in claims than had previously been paid 
over the entire life of the program (Hayes and Neal 2009).
5  The NFIP had to borrow heavily 
from the Treasury and its debt currently exceeds $19 billion.  While the NFIP had borrowed 
from the Treasury in previous years, it was always a small enough amount that it could 
subsequently be repaid. The program is unlikely, though, to be able to repay the current debt 
from Katrina.  Forgiveness of the debt by Congress would create a subsidy from the general 
taxpayer to the program, particularly to those policyholders with discounted premiums.  
Partially in response to the high debt, the program is currently the target of a reform 
effort by FEMA and proposed legislation in Congress.  This policy debate has raised questions 
concerning the distributional impacts of the program.  Some advocacy groups are concerned that 
the NFIP is regressive.  For example, The American Action Forum released a report arguing that 
subsidies in the NFIP ―benefit upper-income households, particularly in Gulf States‖ (Brennon 
and Lowell 2011).  This was echoed in a 2010 report from the Institute for Policy Integrity at 
New York University School of Law that the financial risks and ecological damage the NFIP 
induces are born by all taxpayers but the benefits primarily go to wealthy counties and vacation 
homeowners.  Such reports often reference the fact that there have been large claims payments to 
higher income areas or that many expensive beachfront homes have policies and receive claims.  
This neglects the fact that these areas also pay more in premiums.  Indeed, an accurately priced 
insurance program should be neither progressive nor regressive.  Of course, the concern with the 
NFIP is that its rates are not risk-based, potentially introducing cross-subsidization into the 
program.   
Distributional consequences could arise from two NFIP pricing policies.  First is the 
discounted rates.
6  In general, discounts for pre-FIRM properties are discounts to older structures.  
If this is correlated with income, there would be distributional consequences.  We, unfortunately, 
do not have data on which policies are subsidized and which are not and also do not have data on 
homeowner income or home value and so cannot comment on whether the subsidies currently 
built into the NFIP inherently go more to higher-income households.  A CBO report found, out 
of a sample of 10,000 households in the NFIP, subsidized coastal properties tend to be higher Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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valued, although this is largely because the land is more valuable, not the structure, and that 
inland subsidized properties are generally less valuable than inland unsubsidized properties 
(CBO 2007).  The CBO report also found that just under a quarter of subsidized coastal 
properties are for second homes, vacation homes, or homes rented out year round (CBO 2007).   
Second, as rates are now set to cover the average loss year, the program cannot handle 
catastrophic years.  If taxpayer funds are required to cover high loss years (like 2005), this could 
also have distributional consequences.  It would mean the general taxpayer was covering some of 
the costs of floodplain residents.  No taxpayer money has yet been put into the program and we 
do not consider the distributional consequences of doing so, although this is worthy of further 
study.    
In this paper, we are able to look at total premiums and claims at the county level.  We 
can thus analyze at the county level whether the program has been regressive or progressive 
overall.  This offers initial empirical guidance to policymakers on an area of interest to the 
reform effort that is currently very data scarce.  It should also suggest areas of more detailed 
study on this topic, which is unfortunately limited by the fact that the NFIP does not collect 
income data for policyholders.  
3. Data 
This study utilizes data on total claims paid, the number of policies-in-force, and the total 
premium intake at the U.S. county level from 1980 to 2006,
7 which allows for a county-level 
analysis of how claims compare to premiums.  Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
variables by states.  Total premium intake during the period was about $38 billion while the total 
claims payments were about $37.4 billion.
8  The top five states in terms of total paid claims  
Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama  represent about 75 percent of the total 
claim payments for the nation as a whole.  Louisiana has the highest claim payments which total 
$16.5 billion or 44.2 percent of the total claim payments, followed by Florida ($4 billion or 10.8 
percent of the total payments) and Texas ($3.5 billion or 9.4 percent of the total payments).  This 
finding is largely driven by the unprecedented loss of the 2005 hurricane season on the Gulf 
Coast.
9  When we exclude the year 2005, the ranking changes to Texas (17.8 percent), Florida 
(17.6 percent), Louisiana (13.0 percent), North Carolina (4.6 percent), and New Jersey (4.5 
percent).  The top five states in terms of the premium payment  Florida (34.6 percent), Texas 
(9.4 percent), Louisiana (9.1 percent), California (7.6 percent) and New Jersey (5.8 percent)  
represent about 67 percent of the total amount.   Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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Table 2 shows the summary statistics by year.  The number of NFIP policies has 
increased by about 170 percent between 1980 and 2006, an average increase of 6.5 percent per 
year.  The premium intake has steadily increased over time, from rising prices and more policies-
in-force, while the claim payments appear to be highly correlated with the occurrence of 
historical hurricanes.
10  Hurricanes Charley and Ivan each made a landfall in Florida and 
Alabama in 2004, followed by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita along the Gulf Coast in 2005.  The 
claim payments in 2004 and 2005 and represent 6.3 percent and 48.2 percent and of the total 
claims paid from 1980 to 2006, respectively.  The average premium paid in 2006 was $472.  The 
average premium per policy between 1980 and 2006 is about $432, and the average claim per 
policy during the period is approximately $368.     
Per capita personal income by year for each county is used in the analysis of the 
redistributive effect of the NFIP.
11  Between 1980 and 2006, about 94 percent of U.S. counties 
had at least one NFIP policy-in-force and 80 percent of the counties filed at least one claim.  
Counties with at least one policy had on average per capita personal income of $24,543 whereas 
counties without a policy had per capita personal income of $24,923.  Counties that filed claims 
had on average per capita personal income of $24,846 and counties that did not file claims had, 
on average, per capita personal income of $23,371.  Per capita claim payment exhibited high 
variation—the standard deviation was about $37.76, while the standard deviation of per capita 
premium was $12.58.  The highest per capita premium and per capita claim payment was 
$251.62 and $1,309.48, respectively. 
4. The Measurement of NFIP Progressivity   
In this study, we adapt the well-established tools of tax progressivity to evaluate the 
equity implications of the NFIP.  Modern tax progressivity theory has at its roots Musgrave and 
Thin (1948), who were attempting to quantify an equitable approach to reducing taxes in the 
early post-war period.  More recent developments in measurement of progressivity are well-
summarized by Lambert (2002).  In their most general form, tax progressivity measures are 
based on the familiar Lorenz curve measure of inequality and its associated concentration curve.  
The most commonly used measure of progressivity focuses on the net redistributive 
effect of a fiscal action such as taxes, transfers, and other government programs.  This net 
redistributive effect, which is often referred to as residual progression, measures the equalizing 
effect of the fiscal action.  A fiscal action that improves upon the underlying income distribution 
is progressive, while a fiscal action that results in greater inequality is regressive.  Alternatively, 
there are well-established measures of the departure from proportionality, also based on the Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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Lorenz curve.  This departure from proportionality, also known as liability progression, measures 
the share distribution of the policy effect across units with varying pre-policy income.  Thus 
increases in progressivity are associated with enhanced departure from proportionality for pre-
policy income distribution.   
In the case of taxes, the crucial difference in these classes of measures is that the net 
redistributive effect is influenced by the magnitude of taxes relative to income (tax height), while 
departure from proportionality is scale invariant.  When the level of tax height varies across time, 
these two measures can tell very different stories about changes in tax progressivity, but both are 
valid and offer some insight into changes in tax progressivity.  Alternatively, when the tax height 
are the same the two measures provide identical progressivity rankings.  In our case, NFIP 
premiums are small relative to total county income so we can ignore the ―tax height‖ and focus 
on the departure from proportionality measure of progressivity.   
We begin by defining the Lorenz curve and its related concentration curve.  Let 
  
 ) ( 0
1 p F  be the inverse cumulative distribution function of x, and without loss of 
generality, let  ) (
1 p F
   .   Following Bishop, Chow and Formby (1994), the Lorenz ordinates 
of x (for our analysis, x represents pre-NFIP county income) and the concentration ordinates of y 
(premiums or payments) can be written as follows: 
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) ; ( x L   represents the proportion of pre-NFIP per capita county income received by 
counties with incomes x less than or equal to .
12   ) ; ( y C   indicates the proportion of per capita 
payments received by counties with incomes x less than or equal to  .  A payout concentration 
curve, ) ; ( z C  , orders payouts (z) by county per capita income. Unlike ordinary Lorenz curves a 
concentration curve can lie above the 45 degree line. 
Following Kakwani (1976) and Jakobsson (1976), there is a progressive departure from 
proportionality of the flood insurance payouts if: 
 Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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0 ) ; ( ) ; (   x L z C                                                                                                             (3) 
with one strict inequality prevailing at some .  We can evaluate NFIP per capita premiums in a 
similar manner; however, the sign on equation (3) must be reversed.  For NFIP premiums to be 
progressive, counties must have paid premiums in a smaller proportion than their income.   
The final issue to be considered in this section relates to which of the many indices of 
departure from proportionality (DP) to use to evaluate the flood insurance program.  A frequent 
choice is the index based on the familiar Gini coefficient of inequality and its associated 
concentration index. 
 Given a continuous distribution F(x), the covariance definition of the Gini index is  
)} ( , cov{ ) / 2 ( 1 ) ( ) (
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and the associated concentration index for y = g(x) is 
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 The departure from proportionality is measured as twice the area between the Lorenz curve for 
pre-program income (X) and the concentration curve for payouts (PO) and premiums (PR): 
 
PO X
PO C G    .                                                                                                              (6a) 
X PR
PR G C    .                                                                                                              (6b) 
Using the definitions in (6a) and (6b) results in a positive sign under progressivity and a 
negative sign for regressivity.  Finally, we note that these measures of progressivity are based on 
sample data.  A finding of  (statistically) equal to zero implies proportionality.  Inference tests 
for DP measures are provided by Bishop et al. (1994; 1998).
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5. Results 
Flooding is a catastrophic risk by nature.  Most years, there will be only minimal damage, 
and yet some years damages will be extremely high, as the program saw in 2005.  With a risk 
such as this, it is not clear over what time period it is optimal to examine distributional impacts. Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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The years of high claims will have a dominating influence on the analysis. For a flood event that 
has an annual probability of 1 in 100 or 1 in 500, a few decades is not enough data to accurately 
assess whether the prices are matching the risk.  It just so happened that Katrina hit many low-
income communities, leading to high payments in these areas.  Should next year bring a 
devastating storm to West Palm Beach, Florida, the impact of claims payments might look much 
more regressive.   
This might suggest that we are unable to accurately examine the distributional impacts of 
the program without centuries of data, but we do not believe this to be the case for two reasons.  
First, there is a distribution of floods—while catastrophic floods occur rarely, smaller-scale 
flooding occurs much more frequently.  The distributional consequences of more frequent, but 
smaller, flood events is still of policy concern, particularly since this is the most common type of 
flood event.  We can analyze this by looking at progressivity over many years.  Here, we look at 
progressivity in 5 year, 10 year, and a 25 year blocks.
14  Second, while looking at one location 
over only a short time period would likely not capture the distributional impact of the program, 
we have data for the entire country.  There is some correlation in flood risk around the country 
due to weather patterns and the spatial distribution of river systems, but having data on the entire 
country over space compensates for having fewer observations over time. 
We begin our analysis of NFIP progressivity by examining the departure from 
proportionality using Lorenz and concentration curves for two time periods, 1991-1995 (Table 
3a) and for the 1980-2006 (Table 3b).  Column 1 provides the Lorenz ordinates for per capita 
county income, column 2 provides the concentration ordinates for per capita premiums, and 
column 3 provides the concentration ordinates for per capita NFIP payments.  All three columns 
are population weighted. 
The first column in Table 3a shows that the bottom 10 percent of counties received 6.5 
percent of total income over the period 1991-1995.  These counties paid 5.8 percent of the 
premiums and received 6.8 percent of NFIP payments.  A progressive departure from 
proportionality requires that every premium decile be smaller (no larger) than its corresponding 
income decile.  While for the 1
st, 3
rd and 4
th deciles the share of premiums paid is less than the 
share of county income, the opposite is true for the remaining deciles.  We can summarize this 
finding by noting that the DP index (-0.018) is not significantly different from zero, implying 
that premiums are proportional to income.  In contrast, the concentration ordinates for payments 
are all larger than the corresponding Lorenz ordinates for income implying that NFIP payments 
are progressive.  The progressivity of NFIP payments is shown in Figure 1, where the 
concentration curve of NFIP per capita payments lies everywhere above the Lorenz curve of per Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
10 
capita county income.  As noted above, the concentration curve can (and does in this case) lie 
above the 45 degree line.  The findings in Table 3b for the entire period 1980-2006 are consistent 
with those from the five year period 1991-1995. 
Table 4 provides the departure from proportionality findings for 5 year time periods, the 
decades of the 1980’s and 1990’s, and for the overall period 1980-2006.  In all time periods 
considered NFIP payments are progressive—all of the DP indexes are positive and significant.  
In all cases (except for 1996-2000) the NFIP premiums are proportional to county income. 
To assess the combined or net effect of NFIP program, Table 5 provides the net dollar 
values of the NFIP program (NFIP payments – NFIP premiums).  As noted above, DP 
progressivity indexes are not defined over negative values.  So we report simply the net dollar 
value by county per capita income decile.   Like Table 4, our results are for 5 year time periods, 
decades,  and the overall 1980 to 2006 periods.  Again, like Table 4, we exclude 2005 (Hurricane 
Katrina). 
The first observation is the modest size of the NFIP.  For example, the median (decile 5) 
county gained $0.85 per capita over the entire time period.  Deciles 9 and 10 show net losses of 
$2.38 and $4.37, respectively.  Other than mostly negative values in the top three deciles (recall 
the program is capped), there appears to be little pattern by income.  This supports our notion 
that NFIP is proportional or at most mildly progressive (See Table 5).
  
6. Discussion and Caveats 
This study offers evidence on the progressivity of the NFIP using county level data from 
1980 to 2006.  From county level income data we calculate population-weighted per capita 
income, per capita NFIP premiums, and per capita NFIP payments.  Earlier studies have 
suggested that the benefits of the NFIP ―are enjoyed largely by wealthy counties.‖  Our findings 
indicate that the NFIP premiums are generally proportional while NFIP payments are moderately 
progressive. This suggests that while NFIP rates are not disproportionally benefitting some 
income groups, claims tend to be paid in lower income areas.  Since rates are a function of the 
value of the home and there are no income-based discounts in NFIP pricing, it is intuitive that 
premiums would be proportional.  Payments may be slightly progressive because nationally-
speaking, riskier areas tend to be lower income despite discussions of mansions on the Florida 
coast.  Sarmiento and Miller (2006) find evidence that both higher and lower income people live 
in flood hazard areas, the former because of the aesthetics of waterfront property, and the latter 
because property in risky locations (without high amenities or costly flood mitigation measures) Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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is cheaper.  They also estimate that flood damages are higher to lower income groups, consistent 
with our findings, as well. 
A number of caveats, however, are in order.  First, our findings are by no means a 
complete measure of the redistributional effects of the NFIP as we have no information about the 
individual income of policyholders.  We can thus only make statements about aggregate 
redistributional effects at the level of the county.  Our findings would hold for individuals as 
well, if the income of those buying insurance was symmetric around the income of the county 
population.  While ours is a useful first-order assessment, the largest redistributional effects in 
the program are likely between those policyholders paying discounted rates and those paying 
actuarial rates.  Unfortunately, the income of those subsidized homeowners is unavailable.  More 
detailed analysis of the redistributional effects at the individual level is warranted since claims 
payments are concentrated on a few policies. Around 30 percent of claims payments are made to 
only about 1 percent of policyholders—these are the so-called repetitive loss properties.  FEMA 
has estimated that around 90 percent of repetitive loss properties were constructed pre-FIRM 
(King 2005) and thus are also paying subsidized rates for their insurance.
15   
Second, we have examined the redistributional effect of the programs premiums and 
claims, not any infusion of taxpayer dollars.
16  If Congress chooses to forgive the NFIP’s debt, 
this will create a cross-subsidy from the general taxpayer to policyholders in the program that 
have been paying rates that did not include a catastrophe loading to cover an event like 2005.  
Understanding the redistributional effects of this debt forgiveness would require comparing the 
income of the general taxpayer to policyholders in the program. 
If the risks of flooding can be accurately modeled, then an insurance program should not 
have any redistributional effect.  Premiums paid should be proportional to the value of the 
insured structure and the risk that it faces.  The NFIP, however, is a government program and its 
pricing and policies has been subjected to political pressure.  This first-order analysis suggests 
that this influence has not been directed disproportionally at helping higher income communities, 
as some critics of the NFIP claim.  The slight progressivity we find in payments, however, does 
suggest that the poor may be more at risk for flood damage, whether this is due to location or less 
adoption of flood mitigation measures.  While economists would argue that insurance prices 
should be risk-based and any redistribution handled through other channels (and we concur), this 
analysis does suggest there may be a public role in reducing the vulnerability of lower income 
households to disaster damages.  Finally, it is important to note that this finding of slight 
progressivity in claims payments is still based on those who purchase insurance.  There may be 
low income households in risky locations who choose to forgo insurance because the funds are Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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needed for necessities.  Vouchers to help such households afford insurance may be socially 
desirable. 
Endnotes 
1.  Although the NFIP is supposed to be funded with premiums collected from policyholders 
rather than with tax dollars, the program is, by design, not actuarially sound (see section 2 
for more details).  The program is not structured to build a capital surplus, is likely unable 
to purchase reinsurance to cover catastrophic losses, cannot reject high-risk applicants, 
and is subject to statutory limits on rate increases (GAO 2010). 
2.  The U.S. Congress is discussing options for NFIP reform, including i) a phase out of the 
program’s rate subsidies, ii) an increase in the amount FEMA can raise rates each year, 
and iii) the encouragement of private insurer and reinsurer participation in the market 
(H.R. 1309, The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2011). 
3.  Congress has modified the coverage limits several times but they have been unchanged 
since 1994.  They are not indexed to inflation.  When the total coverage available is 
indexed to 2008 prices, the real value of this limit has varied over our time period by up 
to $200,000 2008 dollars (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010).  Most homeowners 
purchase coverage below the limit (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010). 
4.  The GAO, however, recently reported that the data used is in some cases out-of-date or 
inaccurate and thus might be preventing the program from charging appropriate 
premiums (GAO 2008). 
5.  These are payments for insured properties.  Congress also appropriated over $60 billion 
in disaster relief for Hurricane Katrina.  Some of this money does go to grants for 
individuals (who may be uninsured) but the amount is limited to just over $30,000. 
6.  Rates should not vary by value of the property unless property characteristics that drive 
rates, such as elevation or whether there is a basement, are correlated with value. 
7.  The authors would like to thank Tim Scoville and Scott Holladay for the data. 
8.  Premiums, coverage, and claim payments are adjusted to the 2006 level using a consumer 
price index for the US city average. 
9.  The Congressional Budget Office estimated the value of capital stock destroyed by 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the range of $70 billion to $130 billion, and the State of Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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Louisiana estimated that the economic damage to the state alone could reach $200 billion 
(US Government Accountability Office 2007). 
10. Damage from hurricanes comes from storm surge, wind, and flooding.  The NFIP does 
not cover wind damage, only flood losses from the storm surge and intense rainfall.  
During Katrina, flooding was also caused by levee failures.   
11. Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. 
12. It is important to note that in the construction of Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients we 
weight per capita income by population.  Thus major urban counties are counted in 
proportion to their population size.   
13. A natural question to ask is why not to combine NFIP premiums and payments into an 
overall DP index.  The answer is that this can result in negative values and the 
concentration index is not well defined over negative values.  We provide some results on 
overall program progressivity in Table 5 below. 
14. The appendix provides the DP indexes for per capita NFIP premiums and payments on an 
annual basis for the period 1980 to 2006.   
15. Efforts have been made to bring these structures into compliance with floodplain 
regulations, to remove them completely, and to reduce the amount of the subsidy.  Severe 
repetitive loss properties are being transferred to the NFIP Servicing Agent’s Special 
Direct Facility (SDF).  The properties are eligible for special mitigation grants. 
16. See Wildasin (2008) for a discussion of federal commitments to insure losses from future 
disasters. Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. NFIP Policies-In-Force, Coverage, and Claims by State from 1980 to 2006 
State 
Policies-in-
force as of 
2006 
Premium               
($ million) 







ALABAMA  53,573  341.5  95.3  24,706  985.0 
ALASKA  2,667  29.6  9.6  248  4.9 
ARIZONA  34,766  277.9  90.0  2,167  39.4 
ARKANSAS  16,868  120.0  23.2  3,075  49.7 
CALIFORNIA  276,099  2,888.2  959.4  28,188  646.5 
COLORADO  17,059  167.4  45.4  926  11.8 
CONNECTICUT  35,004  417.3  101.4  9,282  160.4 
DELAWARE  23,081  163.3  53.1  2,428  60.2 
D. OF COLUMBIA  1,511  2.9  1.0  50  1.7 
FLORIDA  2,220,841  13,154.5  5,324.5  138,087  4,046.1 
GEORGIA  87,478  549.2  187.9  8,776  207.4 
HAWAII  55,333  310.6  112.4  2,279  92.3 
IDAHO  7,334  44.8  15.3  405  6.1 
ILLINOIS  47,890  468.8  100.7  21,368  296.1 
INDIANA  28,773  259.1  47.4  7,691  108.6 
IOWA  10,591  109.3  18.9  4,729  82.6 
KANSAS  10,550  108.9  21.1  3,728  75.4 
KENTUCKY  21,827  224.1  42.4  13,217  263.4 
LOUISIANA  505,336  3,471.7  1,067.1  288,635  16,525.8 
MAINE  8,073  94.3  19.9  1,977  38.7 
MARYLAND  64,341  394.4  135.3  9,379  257.1 
MASSACHUSETTS  48,833  578.8  128.0  16,370  330.5 
MICHIGAN  26,474  263.8  56.7  5,800  61.8 
MINNESOTA  8,475  92.1  21.0  5,937  122.0 
MISSISSIPPI  78,068  438.6  121.3  41,594  2,946.2 
MISSOURI  23,732  266.9  49.0  23,877  495.1 
MONTANA  3,541  31.7  7.8  632  5.6 
NEBRASKA  11,985  122.6  25.7  2,195  30.6 
NEVADA  16,419  118.2  39.9  956  45.4 
NEW HAMPSHIRE  7,660  60.3  12.8  1,696  30.7 
NEW JERSEY  218,291  2,191.3  619.5  54,411  933.0 
NEW MEXICO  15,145  96.7  22.6  478  8.7 
NEW YORK  134,331  1,317.1  330.7  44,372  656.7 
N. CAROLINA  131,858  841.1  281.6  43,536  918.5 
N. DAKOTA  5,183  68.8  15.9  5,642  156.1 
OHIO  39,198  343.6  64.0  12,682  216.5 
OKLAHOMA  14,454  152.1  36.4  6,724  163.8 
OREGON  31,175  202.6  61.1  3,040  75.7 
PENNSYLVANIA  66,883  843.8  172.7  37,955  837.6 Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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RHODE ISLAND  14,957  183.9  39.6  1,673  38.7 
S. CAROLINA  192,176  1,120.4  467.8  17,236  669.7 
SOUTH DAKOTA  2,888  26.5  6.0  1,112  17.3 
TENNESSEE  20,366  147.3  36.9  4,753  76.6 
TEXAS  628,346  3,589.9  1,411.8  123,044  3,502.3 
UTAH  4,195  27.4  8.0  485  9.3 
VERMONT  3,263  36.7  6.8  660  9.2 
VIRGINIA  102,664  656.2  233.0  22,143  495.5 
WASHINGTON  34,127  265.2  77.2  7,111  176.9 
WEST VIRGINIA  22,028  216.2  33.7  16,992  330.7 
WISCONSIN  13,362  122.0  24.0  2,949  36.1 
WYOMING  2,529  21.6  5.7  163  2.1 
TOTAL  5,451,601  38,041.0  12,888.5  1,077,190.0  37,358.2 
Note: The column for policies-in-force shows the number of policies as of 2006 while the other columns display 
cumulative counts between 1980 and 2006.  Dollars are measured in 2006 USD. Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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Table 2. NFIP Policies-In-Force, Coverage, and Claims from 1980 to 2006 
Year  Policies-
in-force 
Premium               
($ million) 
Coverage               
($ billion) 












1980  2,022,127  382.8  240.6  41,686  562.4  189.3  278.1 
1981  1,896,521  565.8  225.4  22,078  271.4  298.3  143.1 
1982  1,883,168  736.9  223.3  32,451  411.6  391.3  218.6 
1983  1,964,401  773.5  237.7  51,021  884.3  393.7  450.1 
1984  1,913,257  811.8  240.6  27,467  492.5  424.3  257.4 
1985  2,001,446  843.1  261.3  35,749  654.2  421.2  326.9 
1986  2,100,682  948.0  285.5  12,891  226.9  451.3  108.0 
1987  2,102,319  1,000.0  292.1  12,207  173.0  475.7  82.3 
1988  2,133,693  999.4  298.6  7,431  84.7  468.4  39.7 
1989  2,278,446  1,022.5  430.2  35,498  1,061.8  448.8  466.0 
1990  2,461,336  1,031.8  328.3  14,568  257.9  419.2  104.8 
1991  2,516,038  1,084.9  329.1  28,444  520.2  431.2  206.7 
1992  2,598,402  1,142.0  338.8  44,065  1,010.3  439.5  388.8 
1993  2,801,428  1,232.6  371.9  34,288  849.5  440.0  303.3 
1994  3,011,990  1,355.1  400.6  20,879  534.5  449.9  177.5 
1995  3,444,174  1,497.4  457.2  61,753  1,693.1  434.8  491.6 
1996  3,655,774  1,624.2  499.8  50,955  1,028.8  444.3  281.4 
1997  4,055,957  1,878.7  577.9  30,251  651.4  463.2  160.6 
1998  4,186,084  2,043.0  612.1  54,538  1,057.6  488.1  252.7 
1999  4,276,183  2,057.6  642.6  46,916  901.8  481.2  210.9 
2000  4,318,008  1,995.5  660.6  16,237  292.6  462.1  67.8 
2001  4,409,144  1,958.4  692.5  43,294  1,448.2  444.2  328.4 
2002  4,470,700  1,997.3  728.6  25,210  482.9  446.7  108.0 
2003  4,511,058  2,055.1  753.5  36,220  832.5  455.6  184.5 
2004  4,597,457  2,146.9  811.4  54,930  2,338.7  467.0  508.7 
2005  4,891,691  2,281.6  899.6  211,694  18,004.3  466.4  3,680.6 
2006  5,451,601  2,575.2  1,048.7  24,469  631.1  472.4  115.8 
TOTAL  3,183,448  38,041.0  12,888.5  1,077,190  37,358.2  432.15  368.23 
Note: All states and the District of Columbia are included in the data.  The asterisks denote the average values from 
1980  to 2006.  Dollars are measured in 2006 USD. 
 Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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Table 3. Lorenz and Concentration Ordinates for County Income, 
NFIP Premiums, and NFIP Payouts 
 
 
Table 3A: 1991–1995 
 
Lorenz  Concentration Ordinates 






1  0.065  0.058  0.068 
2  0.143  0.146  0.196 
3  0.226  0.211  0.308 
4  0.311  0.278  0.395 
5  0.408  0.427  0.591 
6  0.507  0.524  0.673 
7  0.612  0.637  0.747 
8  0.723  0.782  0.860 
9  0.844  0.888  0.952 
1.0  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Gini
2  0.138  0.115  -0.059 
DP Index  --     0.018 #  0.192 
               
  Table 3B: 1980–2006 
a 
 
Lorenz  Concentration Ordinates 






1  0.065  0.058  0.088 
2  0.141  0.144  0.211 
3  0.222  0.211  0.362 
4  0.312  0.287  0.476 
5  0.405  0.419  0.599 
6  0.501  0.496  0.670 
7  0.610  0.638  0.742 
8  0.727  0.779  0.788 
9  0.843  0.889  0.948 
1.0  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Gini
2  0.133  0.113  -0.087 
DP Index  --     0.023 #  0.223 
Notes: The pound sign (#) denotes insignificance at the five percent level.  Country income, NFIP premiums and 
payouts are in per capita terms, weighted by population.  Strictly speaking, column 1 provides a Gini coefficient and 
columns 2 and 3 provide corresponding concentration indexes. 
a Excludes 2005 (Hurricane Katrina). Resources for the Future  Bin, Bishop, and Kousky 
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Table 4. Departures from Proportionality, NFIP Premium and Payouts,  
Alternative Time Periods 
 
Periods  Premiums  Payouts 








1980-1989  Proportional 
-0.026 (0.019) 
Progressive 
0.296 (0.045)  






















Notes: The first number is DP index and the second is standard error.  
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 Table 5. Net NFIP by County Per-Capita Income Decile ($) 
(selected time periods) 
Income 
Decile
a  1980-1985  1986-1990  1991-1995  1996-2000  2001-2006
b  1980-2006
c 
1  2.11  -0.50  0.76  0.28  -0.93  0.68 
2  1.30  1.39  0.14  -2.02  -1.02  -0.84 
3  1.24  -0.73  0.17  0.58  -1.54  0.15 
4  0.45  1.04  0.48  .055  -2.60  -0.42 
5  -0.03  -1.04  2.44  -0.01  -0.50  0.85 
6  -0.05  -0.23  0.04  1.53  -1.23  -0.36 
7  0.78  -1.05  -0.20  1.46  1.28  0.68 
8  -0.19  -1.19  -0.22  -2.06  -0.83  -0.39 
9  -0.68  -1.80  1.38  -2.64  -2.91  -2.38 
10  -1.28  -5.23  -3.26  -6.96  -5.98  -4.37 
a County per capita income, population weighted. 
b & c Excludes 2005 (Hurricane Katrina). 
































Figure 1. Lorenz and Concentration Curves of Income and Payouts,  
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1980     -0.0225 #  0.2323 
1981      0.0295 #      0.0398 # 
1982      0.0159 #  0.1018 
1983  -0.0446  0.1450 
1984  -0.0368  0.2873 
1985  -0.0372  0.2846 
1986  -0.0540      0.0950 # 
1987  -0.0687  0.2626 
1988  -0.0446  0.1416 
1989  -0.0962  0.5188 
1990      -0.0368 #  0.3432 
1991  -0.0548      0.0752 # 
1992       0.0003 #  -0.2460 
1993  -0.0321  0.4629 
1994  -0.0291  0.2170 
1995  -0.0615  0.3112 
1996  -0.0392  0.2824 
1997  -0.0499  0.3776 
1998  -0.0519  0.2761 
1999  -0.0761      0.1541 # 
2000  -0.0594  0.2872 
2001  -0.0571  -0.2848 
2002  -0.0730  0.3211 
2003  -0.0519      0.1094 # 
2004      -0.0259 #  0.4102 
2005  -0.1332  0.9694 
2006  -0.0245  0.1126 
a Positive number indicates progressive, the pound sign (#) denotes insignificance at the five percent level, implying 
strict proportionality. 
 